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Abstract
This thesis consists of three essays on optimal monetary policy. In the rst essay I
study time-consistent monetary policy in an small open economy model with incom-
plete nancial markets. I demonstrate the existence of two discretionary equilibria.
The model is capable of explaining periods of di¤erent exchange rate volatilities as
well as the transition between those regimes. Following a shock the economy can be
stabilised either quicklyor slow, where both dynamic paths satisfy the conditions
of optimality and time-consistency. I also show that a policy of partially targeting
the exchange rate results in far worse welfare outcomes relative to a strict ination
targeting policy.
In the second essay, I analyse how a policy maker can avoid expectation traps and
coordination failures. Using a framework developed by Schaumburg and Tambalotti
(2007) and Debortoli and Nunes (2010) in which a policy maker may or may not
default on past promises I show that already mild degrees of precommitment are
su¢ cient to generate uniqueness of the Pareto-preferred equilibrium.
In the last chapter, I examine optimal monetary policy from an empirical per-
spective. I estimate a simple small open economy model separately for a policy
maker acting under commitment and discretion and nd that the data favours the
commitment approach. Furthermore, the data suggest that the Bank of Canada did
not target the nominal exchange rate in the inspected time period.
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